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Abstract 
 
We characterize the effects of interest rate liberalization on OECD banking crises, controlling for 
the standard macro prudential variables that prevail in the current literature. We use the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World database. We test for the direct impacts of interest rate 
liberalization on crisis probabilities and their indirect effects via capital adequacy. Over the period 
1980 - 2012, we find that interest rate liberalization has a crises reducing effect, and it appears that 
the beneficial effects work by strengthening capital buffers. We also show that when controlling 
for liberalization, capital adequacy and liquidity, the main driver of financial crises is property 
price growth. Our results are invariant when we control for alternative sensitivity tests for 
robustness purposes.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
If we are to learn enduring lessons from the sub-prime crisis we need to know whether it 
was in some way unique, or whether it shared features in common with earlier banking crises. 
Recent research focusing on the macro determinants of crises provides evidence that OECD 
banking instability can be explained by capital adequacy, liquidity, house price growth and current 
account imbalances (Barrell et al. 2010; 2013). However by definition, these impacts are 
conditional on the regulatory environment under which banks operate. Over the last three decades 
the regulatory architecture has experienced major transformations, yet there is little consensus as 
to how these changes have affected bank risk taking behavior and hence crises probabilities. Given 
the established links between financial liberalization, crises and efficiency (Barth et al. 2006; 
Agoraki et al. 2011; and Chortareas et al. 2013; 2016), their interaction with regulatory capital 
becomes paramount. Regulation of both deposit and lending rates was common in the OECD 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Edey and Hviding, 1995).  For example, Regulation Q in the U.S. 
enforced interest rate controls for over 50 years on the premise that controlling deposit rate 
competition would allow banks to earn normal profits without resorting to risky loans and this in 
turn mitigated the need for regulatory capital.  
This paper constitutes the first attempt, to our knowledge, to explicitly characterize the 
effects of interest rate liberalization on OECD banking crises between 1980 and 2012. Our 
approach combines both the macro (prudential) and micro strands of the literature on banking 
stability. To capture these dynamics we utilize the economic freedom index drawn from the Fraser 
Institute. Although the index characterizes different aspects of financial liberalization, not all of 
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these are relevant to the OECD.1 We focus explicitly on interest rate restrictions which changed 
under formal liberalization programs in many OECD economies during the 1980s and 1990s. We 
test for the direct impacts of interest rate liberalization on crisis probabilities and their indirect 
effects via capital adequacy.  
Our results show that interest rate liberalization has a crises reducing effect in the OECD. 
Moreover, the beneficial effects of interest rate liberalization, or the removal of financial 
repression (see Reinhart, 2012) seems to work by strengthening the effects of capital buffers. In 
fact, a move towards financial repression after the sub-prime crisis may have marginally increased 
the probability of future crises. We also show that when we control for liberalization, capital 
adequacy and liquidity, the main driver of financial crises is property price growth. Other 
frequently cited factors, such as credit growth and fiscal deficits, do not seem to be significant. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Banks and the factors driving bank crises 
 
Banking crises emerge because banks do not have enough liquidity to meet depositors’ 
needs and cannot access the wholesale market, or because loan losses have built up to the point 
where capital is exhausted. Hence, a relatively simple banking crisis model must include the liquid 
asset and capital ratios as explanatory variables. In addition, we should control for macro factors 
                                                 
1 For example, private sector credit controls as defined by the fiscal deficit to gross savings ratios would be of little 
concern in OECD economies during our sample period. Similarly central government ownership of banks captured 
by the % of deposits held in government banks would be low in market based OECD banking systems. 
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that affect the variability of loan losses and deposits. Before discussing the standard controls used 
in the literature, we note an important omission in these studies: none of them consider the impact 
of interest rate controls on bank behavior and performance. The pace of financial liberalization 
increased over the last three decades, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the 
deregulation process in the European Union (1990s) considerably liberalized banks’ structural and 
conduct rules.2 This was accompanied by a parallel increase in prudential regulation, particularly 
in relation to a minimum capital adequacy.  
The dates of liberalizations in our sample are given in Table 1. Perhaps the most high 
profile liberalization of deposit rates, the phasing out of Regulation Q in the U.S., began in 1980 
and hence falls outside our sample. However, the Nordic countries and the U.K. deregulated their 
housing market lending in the mid-1980s, removing both lending and deposit rate restrictions. The 
U.K. liberalization of Building Society restrictions was phased in from late 1984 to early 1986 and 
hence we record it in 1985.  At the same time both Spain and especially Italy began to relax their 
foreign exchange controls, and these impacted on the regulation of domestic deposit rates in both 
countries. The dismantling of exchange controls in Italy in late 1990 was also associated with 
moves to increase regional competition in banking and also to reduce compulsory reserves at the 
Central Bank, and deposit rates were further liberalized as a result. The granting of independence 
to the Bank of France in 1994 also coincided with significant increases in bank competition and 
interest rate deregulation, but these were in part a result of the European Commission’s response 
to the rescue of Credit Lyonnais. In the run up to the financial crisis in 2007-08 some countries, 
such as Italy attempted to control housing markets with interest rate controls, whilst Norway, by 
then a major balance of payments surplus country, attempted to control its exchange rate and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the banking Directives enacted in the E.U., as part of the Single Market Program. 
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inflation rate with controls on deposit rates in banks. It was the only country in our sample to do 
so over this period. Inevitably after the 2007 and 2008 crises there were a number of attempts to 
tighten controls, and those in the UK and Norway in 2008 and Italy in 2010 are of particular note 
for our purposes. 
It is reasonable to question whether these changes to the regulatory architecture would 
impact on financial stability and crisis incidence. Since crisis prediction studies using 
contemporaneous datasets (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 2005) cannot be classed 
as true early warning systems,3 Barrell et al. (2010; 2013) use lagged data and focus on the 
relatively homogeneous OECD banking system. In this context they show that capital adequacy, 
liquidity, property prices and current account deficits supersede traditional macro variables as 
crisis determinants. The lag structure of these models ensures true early warning properties and 
explanatory power within and out-of-sample is high. In this paper, we continue with the Barrell et 
al. (2013) model but recognize it is contingent on the degree of liberalization in each banking 
sector. Before turning to our interest rate liberalization variable, we briefly summarize the key 
explanatory variables in our base line model.  The average values of real house price growth, 
liquidity and leverage across our sample of 14 countries is plotted in figure 1, along with the 
number of crises in each year between 1980 and 2008.    
 
<Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here> 
 
Crises are often the result of poor quality lending. A boom in real estate prices inflates the 
availability of collateral causing lending to be excessive and credit to be mispriced. Several years 
                                                 
3 These studies also rely on heterogeneous country sets and so the wide country coverage limits the explanatory data 
available for inclusion. 
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after the expansion of lending to borrowers who were not credit worthy, problems normally start 
to appear. As we can see from Figure 1 the house price booms in the late 1980s and the 2000s were 
followed by an increase in the number of financial crises. The problems associated with excess 
lending are exacerbated when real house prices start to fall, as they did around 1990 and also from 
2006 in the U.S., with downturns starting later elsewhere. When prices fall from unsustainable 
levels, this process goes into reverse, sharply tightening credit conditions and overextended 
borrowers have strong incentives to default. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Barrell et al. (2010) 
suggest that property price developments can change crisis probabilities. The incidence of crises 
may be mitigated by adequate levels of capital or by sufficient liquidity. As we can see from Figure 
1 liquidity levels fell in the approach to the rash of crises from 1987 onwards, but levels were 
rebuilt after lessons were learnt. However, from 1999, the new era of international competition in 
banking led to increasing economizing on liquidity levels, making it harder for the system to deal 
with crises as they emerged. In addition, the same environment led banks to begin to economize 
on leverage, and capital buffers began to shrink, raising the risks that a solvency crisis might 
emerge, as indeed it did in 2008.4 
Widening current account imbalances have been common forerunners of banking crises in 
the OECD (Ferretti and Razin, 2000; Edwards, 2002). They may be accompanied by monetary 
inflows enabling banks to expand credit excessively which inflates asset prices in an unsustainable 
manner.5 These trends may be exacerbated by lower real interest rates (Eichengreen and Rose, 
2004). This may explain why financial liberalization often precedes current account liberalization 
                                                 
4 The standard deviation of capital adequacy also rose sharply after 2000, suggesting that some countries economised 
on capital more than others, and this cross section dimension is clearly important in the determination of the incidence 
of crises, as we see below. The standard deviation of liquidity also rose sharply around 2004, suggesting that banking 
systems in some countries were unwisely economising on this safety buffer as well. 
5 In addition foreigners may cease to be willing to finance deficits in domestic currencies if they consider their assets 
are vulnerable to monetization via inflation, and such a cessation can disrupt asset markets and banks’ funding. See 
Haldane et al. (2007) for an assessment of the impact of such a hypothetical unwinding in the U.S. 
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so that banks can manage the intermediation of the capital inflows. The existence of a current 
account deficit also indicates a shortfall of national saving over investment and hence a need for 
the banking sector to access the potentially volatile international wholesale market.  
Other factors that affect loan losses are discussed extensively in Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998; 2005) and Beck et al. (2006). They include real GDP growth, M2/Foreign 
exchange reserves, and inflation which capture macroeconomic developments that affect banks’ 
asset quality. Rapid credit growth may indicate lax lending standards and trigger asset booms, 
while loose monetary policy, given by the short term real interest rate, can have the same effect. 
Fiscal deficits often affect the risk of crises by overheating the economy and because they reduce 
the scope available to recapitalise banks, making systemic crises more likely.6  
Existing research provides strong evidence on the link between financial liberalization and 
various aspects of bank performance. Economic freedom indexes have been associated with 
efficiency (Chortareas et al. 2011), bank ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006), and regulatory structure 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2006; Chortareas et al., 2012). A common thread that 
emerged from these studies is that a high degree of liberalization boosts bank efficiency, reduces 
corruption in lending, or lowers banking system fragility. However, in these studies the index is 
introduced within a set of control variables. It is only recently that empirical studies have focused 
on specific aspects of financial freedom/liberalization and governance effectiveness in banking 
performance (Chortareas et al., 2013; 2016). Such studies which isolate the different impacts, 
confirm the importance of factors such as financial liberalization, including interest rate 
liberalization, on bank efficiency.  
                                                 
6 Fiscal difficulties were not present prior to the sub-prime crisis but emerged afterwards, as the economy slowed 
and authorities had to recapitalize banks.  
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There are several channels by which interest rate controls may affect crisis probabilities. 
Situations where governments control deposit and/or lending rates (which are captured by our 
index), will change the scope and riskiness of banks’ balance sheets and hence the role of capital. 
For example, in situations where there are deposit rates ceilings, a rise in the policy interest rates 
will cause a shortage of bank deposits as funds move elsewhere. As a result of the 
disintermediation, banks may change their scope of operations and move into securitization in 
order to increase non-interest income. Therefore, this form of interest rate restrictions is likely to 
decrease bank efficiency in the manner that Berger et al. (2008) describe. Since systemic risk will 
increase, the role of regulatory capital becomes more important. Conversely, when deposit rates 
are deregulated banks can revert to traditional lending, which is subject to normal regulatory 
capital rules so the marginal benefit of capital is reduced (Hellmann et al., 2000), and crisis 
probabilities should decline.  
Similarly, controls on lending rates may induce banks to find other ways to utilise their 
funds. To maintain profits banks may increase their off balance sheet positions without 
concurrently increasing capital, and such disintermediation may increase systemic risk and hence 
crisis probabilities. When lending rates are market driven, the quantity of loans on banks’ balance 
sheet will increase, but they are more likely to be protected by regulatory capital. Hence, interest 
rate liberalization and capital are likely to influence crisis probabilities both directly and jointly 
(Cecchetti and Kohler, 2014). No systematic attempt exists to explicitly measure the impact of 
interest rate liberalization directly on crisis probabilities and indirectly via capital adequacy and 
this is the task that we pursue in the following sections.   
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3. Methodology and data 
 
We utilize the logit model which has been a standard approach for crisis prediction 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Davis and Karim, 2008, Barrell et al., 2010; 2013). The 
logit estimates the probability that a banking crisis will occur in a given country with a vector of 
explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡). The banking crisis variable (𝑌𝑖𝑡) is a zero-one dummy that takes the 
value of one at the onset of crisis. The logistic estimator is given by: 
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Coefficients show the direction of the effect on crisis probability, although their 
magnitudes are conditional7 on  𝑋𝑖𝑡. We include a constant to allow for the hypothesis that crisis 
probabilities can be exogenous. 
Logit models for banking crises are typically assessed on their predictive success since 
their value lies in their early warning capabilities. Standard goodness-of-fit measures used to assess 
                                                 
7 ßi represents the effect of Xi when all other variables are held at their sample mean values. 
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OLS estimators such as R2, do not apply to logistic regression (which generate maximum 
likelihood estimates) and the adjusted variants for logit (such as Mc Fadden’s R2) cannot be 
interpreted in the same way. In addition, the success of a logit forecast depends on the chosen cut-
off for the probability threshold8: if a low probability threshold is selected, all crises will be called 
correctly but the associated false positive call rate will be high. Conversely, high thresholds will 
result in low levels of crisis identification but correspondingly low false positive call rates. As 
thresholds rise, we reduce correct crisis calls but we also lose false crisis calls; a good model loses 
false crisis calls more rapidly than it loses correct crisis calls.  
Since a logit model’s forecast performance depends on the probability threshold that is 
selected, its performance can be adjusted by regulators who manipulate the threshold. A policy-
maker may rationally choose not to publicly disclose any increases in crisis risk in order to 
maintain depositor confidence and avoid bank runs. Instead they may choose to show regulatory 
forbearance since the cost of crises exceeds the cost of bank bailouts (Kane, 1989; Morrison and 
White, 2013). These policy-makers are then likely to adjust the forecast performance by selecting 
high thresholds that are optimal for their individual loss functions (Laeven and Valencia, 2013; 
Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). This suggests that an unbiased measure of forecast accuracy should 
be independent of the probability threshold and so when we select between our alternative models, 
we take this into account.  
To assess the informational value of our variables we use a novel measure known as the 
AUROC or AUC, which is the Area Under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) Curve. 
This metric tests the “skill” of binary classifiers and hence can be used to discriminate between 
competing crisis models. Because probabilistic forecasts (and their corresponding true positive and 
                                                 
8 Typically for point forecasts, the in-sample crisis frequency is used, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and 
Kamisnky and Reinhart (1999). 
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true negative rates)9 are generated against a continuum of thresholds, the AUC is independent of 
threshold choice. In the terminology of ROC analysis, the two variables of interest are the 
proportions (P) of true positive call rates (also known as sensitivity of the discriminator, which 
equals P (crisis forecast | actual crisis occurs) and the false positive call rates (also known as (1-
specificity)), which equals P (crisis forecast | no actual crisis occurs).10 The ROC maps sensitivity 
as a function of (1-specificity) generating a curve whose integral (AUC) represents the “power” of 
the early warning model. An AUC of 0.5 is equivalent to a “naïve” estimator that replicates a 
random coin toss, whilst an AUC above 0.5 implies the model adds value in terms of the ability to 
call crises correctly with correspondingly lower false negative rates. 
Because of data limitations on the availability of consolidated banking sector information 
on capital, we focus on 14 OECD countries over 1980-2012, namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom, 
and the United States.11 Table 1 list the crises in our sample along with the dates of significant 
liberalizations that we study. The crises between 1980 and 2003 are taken from the Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2005) database which terminates before the sub-prime crisis. They classify 
a crisis if the proportion of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeds 10%, or 
the public bailout cost exceeds 2% of GDP, or systemic crisis caused large scale bank 
nationalization, or extensive bank runs were visible and if not, emergency government intervention 
was visible. In extending the estimation to the end of our sample we rely on Laeven and Valencia 
(2010; 2012) who classify crises if there are significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
                                                 
9 Correspondingly false positive and false negative rates are also generated. 
10 For a recent example of ROC curve usage in the context of crises, see Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Barrell et 
al. (2013).  
11 Although it would be good to include other countries such as Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Switzerland and Turkey (the rest of the original OECD) as well as Australia and New Zealand who joined before the 
start of our data set we cannot do so and maintain the core variables used in the paper. 
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system12 and significant banking policy intervention13 measures were taken in response to 
significant losses in the banking system.  
As discussed in Section 2, the variables included in our model are: real GDP growth, 
inflation, M2/ Foreign Exchange Reserves, real interest rates, fiscal surplus/GDP ratios, the current 
account/ GDP and real domestic credit growth.14 We follow Barrell et al. (2010) and include 
unweighted capital adequacy for banks and bank narrow liquidity as well as real house price 
growth. The data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, with the 
following exceptions: house prices are from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) database 
and unweighted capital adequacy is obtained from the OECD Bank Income and Balance Sheet 
database (except for the U.K., where data are from the Bank of England). Unweighted capital 
adequacy is analogous to the commonly used “leverage ratio” since it does not contain Basel risk 
weights. We use narrow liquidity derived from IFS rather than the broad measure provided in the 
OECD Bank Income and Balance Sheet database because some elements of broad liquidity, such 
as short term bonds and corporate bills, could not be liquidated during the sub-prime crisis.15  
Data on financial liberalization are collected from the by the Fraser Institute (2012) 
database.16 The Fraser’s Economic Freedom of the World Index is the only comprehensive 
                                                 
12 As indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and bank liquidations. 
13 Policy intervention is considered to be significant if at least three out of the following six measures hold: i) extensive 
liquidity support (5% of deposits and liabilities to non-residents); ii) bank restructuring costs (at least 3% of GDP); 
iii) significant bank nationalizations; iv) significant guarantees put in place; v) significant asset purchases (at least 5% 
of GDP), and vi) deposit freezes and bank holidays. 
14 We do not include certain Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998; 2005) variables because they are irrelevant to 
OECD countries. For example, GDP per capita is broadly comparable across OECD countries, while virtually all 
OECD countries have some form of deposit insurance scheme. Variations in the level of credit/GDP (as opposed to 
credit growth) may reflect the differing nature of the financial system in OECD countries (i.e. bank versus market 
dominated) rather than the risk of crisis, and we exclude this variable as well.   
15 Narrow liquidity is defined as a sum of banks’ claims on the general government and the central bank, while total 
assets comprise foreign assets, claims on the general government, central bank and private sector.  
16 There exist two major attempts to measure economic freedom producing the corresponding indexes, namely the 
Economic Freedom of the World Annual Reports produced by the Fraser Institute and the Index of Economic Freedom 
created by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. Given that the data provided by the Heritage 
foundation are limited in the time dimension, in this paper we focus on the Fraser’s Economic Freedom database. 
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economic freedom database that presents the rating for a long time dimension. In particular, we 
explicitly focus on the interest rate liberalization component counterparts of the economic freedom 
index, which captures government controls aiming at setting lending and deposit rates of banks. 
This variable ranges from 0 (i.e. interest rates fully set by the government) to 10 (fully liberalized). 
Countries in which interest rates are determined by the market, monetary policy is stable and real 
deposit and lending rates are positive, receive higher ratings. We discuss the interest rate 
liberalization variable and provide detailed definitions on the variables used in our empirical 
analysis in Appendix B (Tables B.1 and B.2). 
 
4. Results 
 
Our testing strategy involves the estimation of a baseline model (without the effect of 
interest rate liberalization) and assessing its information content. The model is then re-estimated 
with the interest rate liberalization effects and changes to the estimates and information content 
are noted. Finally, we test for the interaction of interest rate liberalization and capital since these 
may both act as substitutable macroprudential tools (Hellmann, et al., 2000; Cecchetti and Kohler, 
2014). 
 
4.1. The baseline vs. interest rate liberalization models 
 
A priori we do not assume the dominance of any explanatory variables, since each 
contributes to a separate hypothesis on the causes of crises. We rely on nested testing of a logit 
model using a general to specific approach to obtain parsimony. Unlike Demirguc-Kunt and 
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Detragiache (2005), all variables are lagged at least one period to provide a true early warning 
model. We follow Barrell et al. (2010) and lag house prices by three years while AIC tests suggest 
that for other variables the appropriate lag length should be set at one. In all our experiments the 
AUC is used as a choice criterion because standard goodness-of-fit measures (such as R2) used in 
OLS do not have analogous interpretations with logistic regressions. In addition, the AUC criterion 
ensures our model selection is not biased by any particular probability threshold. Based on this 
approach, we find more parsimonious models have similar information content to general ones.17 
This suggests that many of the structural variables we include do not enhance our early warning 
system for crises. Below we discuss the different parsimonious specifications that we obtain 
(results for the non-significant variables are presented in Appendix A).  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Table 2 presents the parsimonious form of the results for our baseline model from Barrell 
et al. (2013) versus those from the model that contains the effects of interest rate liberalization. As 
we can see in Appendix A (Table A.1), most of the macroeconomic control variables (including 
GDP growth, credit growth and real interest rates) do not contain information and are not 
significant crisis predictors. However, real house price growth and bank narrow liquidity/assets 
are significant in all specifications.  
The interesting result concerns the elimination of capital once interest rate liberalization is 
introduced and the information content search (AUC) is repeated. Whilst both capital and interest 
rate liberalization have a negative coefficient and therefore independently reduce the likelihood of 
                                                 
17 Although the AUCs are similar, the differential impacts of the explanatory variables in each model are not the same. 
These should be evaluated using the marginal contributions which we discuss in Section 4.3. 
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crisis, the contrast between models 1 and 3 seems to confirm the substitutability of interest rate 
liberalization and capital. This result appears to support the view that removal of deposit and 
lending rate controls allows banks to reduce their risky off balance sheet positions and thus the 
importance of regulatory capital is reduced.  
Past episodes of financial liberalization in our sample are also captured by model 3, which 
suggests that when these countries adopted interest rate liberalization, the current account no 
longer became a significant determinant of crises. The intuition behind these results is explained 
in Brooks and Queisser (1999) who discuss the ordering of liberalization reforms in the financial 
and external sectors that were adopted by most developed countries in our sample period. The 
work of Edwards (1984); McKinnon (1982, 1991) and Stiglitz (1998) led to a consensus that 
financial liberalization should precede current account liberalization so that the subsequent capital 
inflows could be efficiently intermediated by the banking system. This sequencing suggests that 
interest rate liberalization would create the initial impact on banking system risk in our sample and 
that the current account effect would be secondary. This may explain why the current account is 
much more significant in previous specifications (Barrell et al., 2013) where interest rate 
liberalization is not included. 
That interest rate liberalization effectively substitutes for the role of capital does not mean 
that capital contains no informational value. Indeed, a comparison of the area under the curves 
between the baseline model (including capital) and model 3 shows that the elimination of capital 
reduces the AUC (from 0.785 to 0.774). In other words, interest rate liberalization alone may not 
be able to explain all crises because some of these independently arise from a lack of capital. 
Therefore, although model 3 does capture the independent effect of interest rate liberalization its 
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informational value is reduced because it cannot capture the direct crisis reducing effects of capital. 
This is confirmed by the AUC of model 2 which is identical to the AUC of the baseline model. 
As it is clear that interest rate liberalization and capital adequacy have related effects on 
crisis probabilities, it is reasonable to test their interaction. We do this by including interest rate 
liberalization and capital as standalone variables alongside a variable that tests their interaction 
and other macroeconomic controls. This generalized interaction model is detailed in the Appendix 
A (Table A.2). We find capital and interest rate liberalization are not significant as separate 
independent variables, although capital adequacy does enter the model (no. 8) that maximizes the 
AUC. Most of our macroeconomic controls are also not significant, and as we can see from the 
appendix, the AUC is improved by their omission. This suggests that focusing factors such as GDP 
growth, budget balances and real interest rates makes us, at least in the OECD, less able to 
discriminate between periods when there will be crises and when there will not be. When we 
eliminate these insignificant variables to create a parsimonious model, we find that the interaction 
between interest rate liberalization and capital has a negative and significant impact on crises 
probabilities, suggesting that interest rate liberalization strengthens the defensive role of a given 
level of capital. Table 3 compares the estimates for the baseline model (without the interaction) 
and the model which interacts capital with interest rate liberalization.18  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
                                                 
18 The transmission of interest rate liberalization to a reduction in financial instability occurs via a change in the scope 
of banking activity so that for a given level of capital, their balance sheet position improves, increasing the marginal 
benefit of capital. This transmission differs from direct regulatory changes to capital adequacy, where for a given 
portfolio of a bank lending, capital requirements are raised. For example, the switch from Basel I to Basel II did not 
restrict the scope of bank lending but required commensurate increases in the quality of capital. This may explain why 
when we test the interaction between a dummy which captures the adoption of Basel II with capital, we find that the 
coefficient is negative but insignificant.   
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The interaction effect clearly increases the predictive power of the early warning system 
as can be seen by the AUC which increases from 0.785 to 0.792. In terms of our selection criteria 
we would therefore choose the interaction model as the preferred explanation of OECD banking 
crises. In the next sections we evaluate the model performance and subject it to various robustness 
tests.  
 
4.2. In-sample and forecast performance 
 
We evaluate the forecast performance of our preferred interaction model against the 
baseline version using the in- and out- of sample crisis call rates. Between 1980 and 2008 our in-
sample frequency of crises is 0.063. A predicted probability in excess of this is classed as a ‘correct 
call’.19  On this basis our interaction model called 11 out of 12 crises (91% success rate) in the 
sub-prime period, with only one missed crisis in Germany. The crises that were correctly identified 
are Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, France, Spain, U.K. and U.S. (the last two 
countries being classed as having two distinct crises). One can argue that the German crisis did not 
follow from domestic problems, but rather from excessive exposure to U.S. sourced Mortgage 
Backed Securities. There were only two false calls, which occurred in Canada, where the 
combination of an oligopolistic banking system, a well-organized central bank and close 
knowledge of U.S. mortgage markets resulted in lower systemic risk. 
 Out of sample performance is perhaps more revealing. Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
suggest that there were three systemic crises after 2008: Germany (2009), Denmark (2009) and 
Spain (2011). Our model fails to call Germany but can detect the other two crises. The true crisis 
                                                 
19 Assuming it occurred either in the crisis year or the preceding year. 
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call rate is 67% whilst the false crisis call rate20 is just under 40%, but these are once again heavily 
concentrated in Canada and to a lesser extent U.K. and France. Given the good forecasting 
performance of our preferred model we next turn to examine the marginal contributions of the 
explanatory variables to crises in the OECD.  
 
4.3. The relative importance of factors contributing to crisis incidence 
 
It is useful to examine the relative contributions of factors that have affected the incidence 
of crises in our sample period. This involves calculating the marginal effects of each variable 
across time period and country and using these to assess the changes in probabilities indicated by 
the model. The marginal effects of logit models cannot be interpreted in the same manner as linear 
regression models since: 
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where, )( is the logistic cumulative distribution function,  is the vector of coefficients and 
tjix ,,  
is the vector of our explanatory variables (see Greene, 2012). Hence, in logistic regressions, 
marginals are not single estimates but depend on the value of 
tjix ,,  and as such cannot be discerned 
directly from the coefficients. For each variable )(i  in each country )( j  and each time period )(t  
                                                 
20 There were 22 false crisis calls, with the largest number being in Canada (4), in the forecast period. 
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we calculate the proportional contribution (
tjiContrib ,, ) of the factor tjix ,,  to the change in 
predicted probability by computing: 
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In table 4 the average contributions across countries are reported for each decade. The most 
striking result is that house price appreciation in the OECD was the largest contributor to systemic 
risk during the 1980s and 2000s. During the 1980s increases in risky mortgages were partially 
offset by interest rate liberalization and bank liquidity but inadequacies in capital elevated crisis 
risk.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
In the 1990s capital ratios were the major factor driving changes in crisis incidence and 
regulation had no overall effect. During the 1980s when countries embarked on liberalization 
programs, capital was a less important crisis determinant whereas by the 1990s when much of the 
liberalization was complete, capital became the principle cause of crisis. In the 2000s the decline 
in liquidity contributed about 40 per cent to the change in probabilities whilst house price growth 
was also a major factor. The reversal of liberalization around the sub-prime crisis in some OECD 
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countries means that this variable had a minor impact on the probability of crises, raising it 
slightly.21  
 
4.4. Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we present a variety of additional estimates to examine the robustness of 
our results. These tests deal with the sensitivity of our results to: (i) dropping the systemic crises 
countries individually, (ii) relaxing the assumption of the one year lag structure, (iii) estimating 
the results up to the 2006 (to exclude the sub-prime crisis), and (iv) testing the importance of 
concentration.  In particular, we re-estimate the logit equation from Tables 2 and 3 using a number 
of alternative procedures. Following Barrell et al. (2010), we allow for the possibility that our 
results are driven by extreme volatility in our independent variables that is caused by systemic 
crises. By removing the major systemic crises from our sample and re-estimating the model we 
can confirm its robustness even in the absence of systemic events. This results in the deletion of 
the U.K., the U.S., Japan, Norway, Finland and Sweden individually and the U.S. and Japan 
together to accommodate the high degree of contagion between their banking systems. The 
estimations in Table 5 show that our results remain virtually the same as those discussed in Section 
4.1.  
Secondly, to confirm whether our results rest on the assumption of the one year lag 
structure, we allow for the possibility that our independent variables started influencing crises 
probabilities two years prior to their onset. As shown in Table 6 this amendment does not change 
                                                 
21 See Reinhart (2012) for a discussion on the increases in financial repression that have occurred in several OECD 
countries in the post sub-prime crisis (2008-2012) era. These repressive measures have effectively imposed interest 
rate ceilings on bank deposits.    
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the results to any great extent. The global magnitude of the sub-prime crisis is well known and it 
could be argued that our estimation parameters arise from the inclusion of this episode in our 
sample. To check that our result can be applied to the OECD from the 1980s onwards we terminate 
our sample at 2006. Table 7 shows that our results remain robust indicating interest rate 
liberalization should be an important policy issue.  
Finally, we check whether our results are robust to the degree of bank concentration. Beck 
et al. (2006) find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems 
(the “concentration-stability” hypothesis) because enhanced market power increases supernormal 
profits and higher charter values reduce the incentive to take risk. Interestingly, when we test for 
the role of concentration using the Beck et al. (2006) data, we also find a negative but insignificant 
coefficient in the baseline model and a positive but still insignificant coefficient in the model that 
contains the interaction term. One explanation is that the sample period of Beck et al. (2006) does 
not capture several episodes of liberalization in our OECD sample. The results are reported in 
Appendix C (Tables C.1 and C.2).  
 
<Insert Tables 5-7 about here> 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We show that over the last 35 years interest rate liberalization had a crisis reducing effect 
in the OECD alongside capital, liquidity and current account surpluses. The main forms of 
liberalizations have been reductions on constraints of activities and products, in the presence of 
less rigorous capital and liquidity requirements. On the other hand, property price growth 
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consistently raised crisis risk. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative estimation checks, 
including country eliminations and exclusion of the sub-prime episode.  
It is often thought that liberalization is associated with an increased incidence of financial 
crises. Our results show this is not always the case; financial liberalization cannot be related to 
systemic risk in a generic way. Liberalization encompasses many different channels by which bank 
behavior may be affected, ranging from general law and order to particular restrictions on banking 
activity. When we test interest rate liberalization specifically, we find it has a crisis reducing effect 
due to its interaction with capital adequacy. The removal of interest rate controls appears to 
increase the marginal benefit of regulatory capital, in part by inducing banks to reduce their risky 
off balance sheet positions, which reduces systemic risk.  
These results are of policy interest, especially in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis where 
regulators have leant toward increased financial repression in order to limit the way in which banks 
intermediate funds. When house prices continue to rise, increased restrictions on bank activity 
through interest rate controls may be counterproductive. From a policy perspective, regulators 
should monitor future house price dynamics which they may need to mitigate. In addition, the 
promotion of market based interest rates may yield benefits in terms of financial stability. 
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Table 1 
List of banking crises and finacial liberalization episodes. 
Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden U.K. U.S. Total 
0 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1984 0 1 
0 0 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1988 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1990 0 0 1990 0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 1991 0 0 0 1991 0 0 0 1991 1991 0 4 
0 0 0 0 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1995 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2007 2007 2 
2008 0 2008 0 2008 2008 0 0 2008 0 2008 2008 2008 2008 9 
0 0 2009 0 0 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2011 0 0 0 1 
Note: Crises dates are from Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and from Laeven and Valencia (2010; 2012) databases.  
 
 
Liberalization dates . 
Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden U.K. U.S. 
   1985 1995  1985   1985 1985 1985 1985  
      1990   2000     
         2001    2002    
         2004    2005    
       2006   2007     
         2008     
         2009   2009  
 2010     2010        
Note: Dates on financial liberalization are collected from the by the Fraser Institute (2012) database. Dates in italics indicate a move towards financial 
repression and thus an increase in interest rate controls.  
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Figure 1   
Factors associated with Crises since 1980. 
 
Note: The average values are calculated for the in-sample period (1980 and 2008). 
 
 
Table 2 
The effects of interest rate liberalization on crises probabilities. 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Onset 
Regression Stages 
Baseline Model Interest Rate Liberalization 
  
With Capital Parsimonious 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Interest Rate Liberalization (-1) 
- 
-0.148     
(0.130) 
-0.226 
(0.000) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) 
-0.131     
(0.000) 
-0.099     
(0.007) 
-0.093     
(0.008) 
 Real House Price (-3) 
0.096     
(0.004) 
0.105    
(0.002) 
0.116 
(0.000) 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.156     
(0.018) 
-0.121     
(0.074) 
- 
 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
-0.288     
(0.000) 
-0.106     
(0.450) - 
AUC 0.785 0.785 0.774 
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator.  
Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values). 
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Table 3 
Interaction between interest rate liberalization and capital adequacy. 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Onset 
Regression Stages 
Baseline 
Model Interaction 
 
Interest Rate Liberalization*Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
- -0.031    
(0.000) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) -0.131    
(0.000) 
  -0.13   
 (0.000) 
 Real House Price (-3) 0.096    
(0.004) 
0.101    
(0.003) 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) -0.156    
(0.018) 
-0.158    
(0.018) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) -0.288    
(0.000) 
- 
AUC 0.785 0.792 
 Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator.  
Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Relative contributions of variables to crisis probabilities. 
  Variables 
Years 
Interest  rate liberalization      Capital       Liquidity     Real house prices 
1980s -0.01 0.1 -0.05 0.89 
1990s 0 1.18 0.02 -0.27 
2000s 0.04 -0.03 0.38 0.55 
Source: Authors' calculations.   
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Table 5 
Results for country elimination tests. 
Final panel (a) U.K. U.S. Japan 
U.S. & 
Japan 
Norway Finland Sweden 
Interest Rate Liberalization 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
-0.226 -0.196 -0.167 -0.250 -0.189 -0.315 -0.363 -0.225 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.190) (0.014) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006) 
-0.093 -0.084 -0.088 -0.094 -0.090 -0.098 -0.110 -0.092 
(0.008) (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) 
0.116 0.114 0.121 0.116 0.121 0.119 0.129 0.116 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final panel (b) Interaction U.K. U.S. Japan 
U.S. & 
Japan Norway Finland Sweden 
Interest Rate Liberalization * 
Capital Adequacy 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
included 
not 
include 
-0.031 -0.028 -0.024 -0.028 -0.026 -0.026 -0.033 -0.024 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) (0.023) (0.001) (0.015) 
-0.130 -0.116 -0.102 -0.125 -0.115 -0.120 -0.140 -0.111 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
0.101 0.101 0.117 0.102 0.111 0.100 0.101 0.104 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
-0.158 -0.147 -0.123 -0.157 -0.146 -0.155 -0.165 -0.154 
(0.018) (0.037) (0.078) (0.019) (0.033) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) 
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator. Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient 
(p-values). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Results for the second lag.  
 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization * 
Capital Adequacy 
Interest Rate Liberalization 
Interest Rate Liberalization (-2) - -0.228 
 - (0.000) 
Liquidity Ratio (-2) -0.126 -0.088 
 (0.000) (0.008) 
D Real House (-3) 0.102 0.117 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Interest Rate Liberalization*Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (-2) 
-0.031 - 
(0.000) - 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-2) 
-0.185 - 
(0.012) - 
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator.  
Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values). 
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Table 7 
Results excluding the sub-prime crisis. 
 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization * 
Capital Adequacy 
Interest Rate Liberalization 
Interest Rate Liberalization (-1) - -0.330 
 - (0.000) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) -0.084 -0.053 
 (0.018) (0.1464) 
D Real House (-3) 0.097 0.110 
 (0.019) (0.003) 
Interest Rate Liberalization*Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
-0.055 - 
(0.000) - 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.350 - 
(0.010) - 
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator.  
Estimated period: 1980-2006. Coefficient (p-values). 
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Appendix A 
 
A.1 The effects of interest rate liberalization on crises probabilities. 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Onset 
Regression Stage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Interest Rate Liberalization (-1) 
-0.287    
(0.196) 
-0.287    
(0.194) 
-0.283    
(0.199) 
-0.245    
(0.223) 
-0.268    
(0.148) 
-0.267    
(0.149) 
-0.266    
(0.150) 
-0.148    
(0.130) 
-0.212    
(0.000) 
-0.226    
(0.000) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) 
-0.112    
(0.011) 
-0.112    
(0.011) 
-0.114    
(0.009) 
-0.118    
(0.005) 
-0.117    
(0.005) 
-0.107    
(0.005) 
-0.106    
(0.005) 
-0.099    
(0.007) 
-0.096    
(0.007) 
-0.093    
(0.008) 
D Real House Price (-3) 
0.117    
(0.002) 
0.117    
(0.002) 
0.117    
(0.002) 
0.115    
(0.002) 
0.116    
(0.001) 
0.109    
(0.001) 
0.107    
(0.002) 
0.105    
(0.002) 
0.103    
(0.002) 
0.116    
(0.000) 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.104    
(0.219) 
-0.104    
(0.218) 
-0.108    
(0.195) 
-0.101    
(0.213) 
-0.108    
(0.157) 
-0.126    
(0.063) 
-0.124    
(0.067) 
-0.121    
(0.074) 
-0.103    
(0.087)   
Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
-0.102    
(0.525) 
-0.103    
(0.503) 
-0.106    
(0.49) 
-0.1    
(0.508) 
-0.107    
(0.473) 
-0.129    
(0.366) 
-0.123    
(0.389) 
-0.106    
(0.450)     
Constant 
1.006    
(0.683) 
1.008    
(0.682) 
1.077    
(0.657) 
0.647    
(0.771) 
1.016    
(0.573) 
1.194    
(0.502) 
1.302    
(0.461)       
ΔGDP (-1) 
0.077    
(0.573) 
0.077    
(0.573) 
0.078    
(0.571) 
0.089    
(0.513) 
0.083    
(0.54) 
0.06    
(0.638)         
Budget Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.034    
(0.692) 
-0.034    
(0.692) 
-0.038    
(0.652) 
-0.045    
(0.574) 
-0.045    
(0.578)           
Real Interest Rate (-1) 
0.049    
(0.596) 
0.049    
(0.596) 
0.046    
(0.614) 
0.019    
(0.777)             
Inflation (-1) 
-0.072    
(0.671) 
-0.072    
(0.669) 
-0.072    
(0.668)               
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves (-1) 
0    
(0.847) 
0    
(0.846)                 
Δ Domestic Credit (-1) 
0    
(0.991)                   
AUC 0.805 0.805 0.806 0.807 0.797 0.800 0.803 0.797 0.794 0.774 
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator. Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values). 
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A.2 The effects of Interest Rate Liberalization*Capital Adequacy on crises probabilities. 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Onset 
Regression Stage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Interest Rate Liberalization*Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
-0.125    
(0.418) 
-0.123    
(0.418) 
-0.124    
(0.415) 
-0.074    
(0.13) 
-0.067    
(0.143) 
-0.071    
(0.092) 
-0.069    
(0.097) 
-0.069    
(0.097) 
-0.021    
(0.12) 
-0.031    
(0.000) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) 
-0.113    
(0.011) 
-0.113    
(0.011) 
-0.115    
(0.009) 
-0.113    
(0.009) 
-0.117    
(0.005) 
-0.116    
(0.006) 
-0.106    
(0.006) 
-0.104    
(0.006) 
-0.108    
(0.007) 
  -0.13   
(0.000) 
D Real House Price (-3) 
0.121    
(0.001) 
0.121    
(0.001) 
0.12    
(0.001) 
0.12    
(0.001) 
0.118    
(0.001) 
0.12    
(0.001) 
0.111    
(0.001) 
0.11    
(0.001) 
0.104    
(0.002) 
0.101    
(0.003) 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.112    
(0.197) 
-0.111    
(0.198) 
-0.115    
(0.178) 
-0.113    
(0.182) 
-0.105    
(0.199) 
-0.111    
(0.15) 
-0.132    
(0.052) 
-0.129    
(0.056) 
-0.14    
(0.043) 
-0.158    
(0.018) 
Constant 
-4.037    
(0.551) 
-4.002    
(0.552) 
-3.953    
(0.556) 
-1.642    
(0.165) 
-1.705    
(0.146) 
-1.58    
(0.13) 
-1.361    
(0.167) 
-1.248    
(0.191) 
-0.771    
(0.384)   
Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
1.091    
(0.46) 
1.083    
(0.461) 
1.089    
(0.458) 
0.604    
(0.234) 
0.541    
(0.261) 
0.575    
(0.211) 
0.53    
(0.237) 
0.537    
(0.23)     
ΔGDP (-1) 
0.081    
(0.559) 
0.081    
(0.559) 
0.081    
(0.556) 
0.078    
(0.571) 
0.088    
(0.518) 
0.083    
(0.538) 
0.058    
(0.649)       
Budget Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.043    
(0.617) 
-0.043    
(0.614) 
-0.047    
(0.579) 
-0.042    
(0.613) 
-0.049    
(0.54) 
-0.05    
(0.54)         
Real Interest Rate (-1) 
0.044    
(0.637) 
0.044    
(0.638) 
0.041    
(0.657) 
0.042    
(0.645) 
0.015    
(0.818)           
Inflation (-1) 
-0.062    
(0.722) 
-0.06    
(0.725) 
-0.062    
(0.719) 
-0.07    
(0.677)             
Interest Rate Liberalization (-1) 
0.241    
(0.732) 
0.235    
(0.735) 
0.243    
(0.727)               
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves (-1) 
0.000                  
(0.81) 
0.000   
(0.813)                 
Δ Domestic Credit (-1) 
0.000    
(0.948)                   
AUC 0.819 0.815 0.814 0.817 0.812 0.810 0.806 0.813 0.796 0.792 
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator. Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values). 
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Appendix B 
 
B.1 Variables description and sources. 
Variables Description Sources 
 
This variable is constructed using data on credit-market controls and regulations and takes values between 
0 and 10. Countries with interest rates determined by the market, stable monetary policy and reasonable 
real-deposit and lending-rate spreads received higher ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily 
by market forces as evidenced by reasonable deposit and lending-rate spreads, and when real interest rates 
were positive, countries were given a rating of 10. A zero rating was assigned when the deposit and lending 
rates were fixed by the government and real rates were persistently negative by double-digit amounts or 
hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit market.     
Economic Freedom of the 
World. Fraser Institute. 
Interest Rate Liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
  
       
Liquidity Ratio The variable is constructed as the ratio of narrow liquidity over total assets. Narrow liquidity is defines as 
the sum of banks' claims on general government and the central bank, whereas total assets comprise 
foreign assets, claims on general government, central bank and private sector.  
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database.  
  
  
Real House Price This variable is the nominal house price growth that has been adjusted with the GDP deflator. 
Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) database 
       
Current Account Balance This variable is measured as the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income and net 
secondary income, as a percentage of GDP. 
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database.  
  
            
Capital Adequacy Ratio This variable measures the unweighted capital adequacy ratio (leverage) as a ratio of capital and reserves 
relative to total balance sheet assets. 
OECD income statement and 
balance sheet database. Bank 
of England (for U.K.). 
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B.2 Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Mean Max Min St.Dev. 
     
Interest Rate Liberalization 9.6 10.0 4.0 1.2 
Liquidity Ratio 14.2 39.7 0.9 8.0 
Real House Price 1.8 36.2 -20.3 7.1 
Current Account Balance 0.9 16.4 -10.0 3.9 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 5.4 11.6 1.1 2.0 
  Source: Authors' calculations. Sample period: 1980-2010. 
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Appendix C 
 
C.1 The effects of bank concentation in our baseline model. 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Onset 
Regression Stage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Interest Rate Liberalization (-1) 
-1.477 
(0.037) 
-1.461   
(0.035) 
-1.464 
(0.036) 
-1.305 
(0.022) 
-1.223 
(0.013) 
-1.084 
(0.011) 
-1.006 
(0.012) 
-0.908 
(0.016) 
-0.907 
(0.014) 
-0.932 
(0.012) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) 
-0.108    
(0.382) 
-0.10    
(0.356) 
-0.085 
(0.337) 
-1.131 
(0.060) 
-0.122 
(0.050) 
-0.113 
(0.057) 
-0.115 
(0.045) 
-0.121 
(0.028) 
-0.101 
(0.047) 
-0.097 
(0.056) 
D Real House Price (-3) 
0.148    
(0.074) 
0.144    
(0.070) 
0.139 
(0.067) 
0.107 
(0.076) 
0.098 
(0.057) 
0.100 
(0.053) 
0.100 
(0.047) 
0.100 
(0.044) 
0.098 
(0.046) 
0.124 
(0.004) 
Constant 
2.71    
(0.709) 
2.838    
(0.695) 
3.300 
(0.638) 
6.182 
(0.275) 
4.994 
(0.230) 
5.028 
(0.215) 
4.843 
(0.216) 
5.452 
(0.158) 
6.078 
(0.099) 
  
Inflation (-1) 
0.444    
(0.232) 
0.440    
(0.236) 
0.434 
(0.244) 
0.0505 
(0.100) 
0.455 
(0.083) 
0.458 
(0.074) 
0.386 
(0.111) 
0.265 
(0.200) 
0.193 
(0.307) 
  
ΔGDP (-1) 
0.000    
(0.192) 
0.417  
(0.181) 
0.379 
(0.151) 
0.321 
(0.179) 
0.316 
(0.181) 
0.292 
(0.210) 
0.297 
(0.201) 
0.227 
(0.254) 
    
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves (-1) 
0.000    
(0.211) 
0 .000   
(0.173) 
0.000 
(0.146) 
0.000 
(0.243) 
0.000 
(0.197) 
0.000 
(0.241) 
0.000 
(0.250) 
      
Δ Domestic Credit (-1) 
0.000    
(0.223) 
0.000 
(0.215) 
0.000 
(0.188) 
0.000 
(0.265) 
0.000 
(0.246) 
0.000 
(0.314) 
        
Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
0.564    
(0.320) 
0.526 
(0.300) 
0.507 
(0.303) 
0.264 
(0.492) 
0.224 
(0.541) 
          
Real Interest Rate (-1) 
0.094    
(0.777) 
0.073 
(0.809) 
0.078 
(0.801) 
-0.083 
(0.492) 
            
Concentration 
0.010  
(0.801) 
0.010 
(0.797) 
0.005 
(0.881) 
              
Budget Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
-0.060    
(0.806) 
-0.055 
(0.816) 
                
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
0.062    
(0.875) 
                  
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator. Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values). 
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C.2 The effects of bank concentration in out inteation model. 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Onset 
Regression Stage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Interest Rate Liberalization*Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
-0.963 
(0.428) 
-1.035 
(0.187) 
-1.106 
(0.106) 
-1.114 
(0.107) 
-1.136 
(0.106) 
-1.239 
(0.078) 
-1.230 
(0.055) 
-1.250 
(0.057) 
-1.292 
(0.065) 
-0.234 
(0.004) 
Liquidity Ratio (-1) 
-0.198 
(0.290) 
-0.192 
(0.085) 
-0.200 
(0.056) 
-0.191 
(0.057) 
-0.178 
(0.052) 
-0.174 
(0.053) 
-0.190 
(0.032) 
-0.207 
(0.016) 
-0.184 
(0.027) 
-0.120 
(0.036) 
D Real House Price (-3) 
0.151 
(0.080) 
0.150 
(0.056) 
0.153 
(0.046) 
0.143 
(0.037) 
0.130 
(0.038) 
0.144 
(0.014) 
0.151 
(0.010) 
0.160 
(0.004) 
0.152 
(0.006) 
0.134 
(0.005) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (-1) 
9.606 
(0.403) 
10.070 
(0.185) 
10.726 
(0.110) 
10.834 
(0.111) 
10.995 
(0.112) 
12.028 
(0.084) 
11.886 
(0.060) 
12.247 
(0.058) 
12.592 
(0.067) 
2.306 
(0.011) 
Constant 
-37.382 
(0.465) 
-39.253 
(0.272) 
-42.047 
(0.1929) 
-42.213 
(0.197) 
-45.532 
(0.167) 
-49.650 
(0.138) 
-48.256 
(0.110) 
-48.953 
(0.115) 
-51.277 
(0.123) 
-2.058 
(0.161) 
Interest Rate Liberalization (-1) 
3.255 
(0.580) 
3.729 
(0.324) 
4.136 
(0.2156) 
4.142 
(0.220) 
4.401 
(0.198) 
4.870 
(0.156) 
4.840 
(0.121) 
4.844 
(0.130) 
5.149 
(0.132) 
  
ΔGDP (-1) 
0.209 
(0.348) 
0.275 
(0.237) 
0.269 
(0.239) 
0.246 
(0.246) 
0.241 
(0.251) 
0.212 
(0.268) 
0.193 
(0.285) 
0.194 
(0.296) 
    
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
0.081 
(0.828) 
-0.213 
(0.462) 
-0.200 
(0.468) 
-0.196 
(0.471) 
-0.157 
(0.563) 
-0.214 
(0.400) 
-0.134 
(0.560) 
      
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves (-1) 
0.000 
(0.555) 
0.000 
(0.577) 
0.000 
(0.584) 
-0.000 
(0.548) 
-0.000 
(0.467) 
-0.000 
(0.490) 
        
Inflation (-1) 
0.297 
(0.455) 
0.285 
(0.420) 
0.267 
(0.425) 
0.237 
(0.455) 
0.159 
(0.571) 
          
Real Interest Rate (-1) 
0.054 
(0.876) 
-0.160 
(0.576) 
-0.165 
(0.561) 
-0.146 
(0.599) 
            
Budget Balance (% of GDP) (-1) 
0.006 
(0.981) 
-0.052 
(0.751) 
-0.046 
(0.772) 
              
Δ Domestic Credit (-1) 
0.000 
(0.825) 
-0.000 
(0.823) 
                
Concentration 
-0.000 
(0.997) 
                  
Note: the reported coefficients are the outcome of the logit estimator. Estimated period: 1980-2008. Coefficient (p-values). 
 
